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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments
Lawrence D. Levien*
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act' became law in 1967,
after numerous attempts to enact such legislation had failed.2 The
focus of the ADEA, like Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is
to ensure and promote the employment of individuals without re-
gard to arbitrary, and therefore, forbidden criteria. The Act is spe-
cifically designed to:
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.4
The Act was not vigorously enforced in the early years. The in-
creased public awareness of its prohibitions, however, along with a
more active government enforcement policy, has resulted in signifi-
cantly increased ADEA litigation. Employers, employment agen-
cies, and labor organizations are consequently concerning them-
selves with the Act's provisions, and their interpretation.
This article attempts to explore these topics, and to anticipate
future trends in the development of the ADEA. Part I discusses the
* B.A., Williams College (1968); J.D., Harvard University (1971); Attorney with Appel-
late Court Section of the N.L.R.B. (1971-73); associate, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and
Feld, Washington, D.C.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as ADEA or the "Act"].
2. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1967) (individual views of
Senator Javits). The Act was amended in 1974 so as to broaden its coverage to both the federal
government and the states. The 1974 revisions were made in conjunction with amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (Supp. June 1974) [hereinafter cited
as the FLSAI.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). As of latest count, 32 states also have age discrimination
laws. This number represents an increase of eight state age laws over the number in existence
on the date of the Act's passage. Cf. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
5. Chief Judge of the Northern District of Georgia, Sidney Smith, was able to state, as
late as December 27, 1971, that "[tihere appear to be only two reported cases under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967." Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F.
Supp. 231, 233 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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general provisions contained in the ADEA and their relationship to
other federal labor laws. Part II sets forth the general principles
concerning the burden of proof required of a plaintiff in order to
state a prima facie case of discrimination under the Act. Part III
deals with the various defenses available to defendants after a prima
facie case has been established. Finally, Part IV deals with the
available remedies once age discrimination has been proven.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. Substantive Prohibitions
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age, [or] to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's age .... I
Prior to 1974, an employer was defined as any person "engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks . . . ." The 1974 amendments, however, reduced the re-
quired number of employees to twenty,8 and included both the fed-
eral and state governments in the definition of employer.'
Labor organizations are similarly prohibited from practicing age
discrimination. The Act's provisions, both as to the prohibition of
discrimination and as to the definition of a labor organization,
virtually trace the language of Title VII.' There are, however, two
minor differences in the manner in which the ADEA treats labor
6. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (2) (1970).
7. Id. § 630(b).
8. 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b) (Supp. June 1974).
9. Id. § 633(a) (included the federal government). In the interest of brevity, this article
will concern itself only with the ADEA's application to the private sector. Id. § 630(b)
effected the change as to state governments.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(c), 630(e) (1970).
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organizations. While Title VII has five forbidden criteria," the
ADEA contains only the forbidden criterion of age. It also specifies
that a labor organization must have a membership of twenty-five
before it is covered by the Act's provisions." Employment agencies
are treated identically under the two statutes and thus they too are
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of age.'3
The ADEA prohibits those defined as employers, labor organiza-
tions, or employment agencies from engaging in age discrimination
with respect to individuals who are at least forty years of age but
less than age sixty-five.' 4 These age limits, particularly the lower
limit, have received both praise and criticism from the legal com-
munity.'5 The criticism stems from the fact that an employer may
legally deny employment to an individual thirty-nine years of age
on the basis of age, only to be forced to either hire him or face
discrimination charges if the same individual reapplies for employ-
ment the following year. 6 Arguably, there exists no reason to pre-
sume that someone in his or her late thirties is not as much in need
of protection against age discrimination as is someone forty years
old.'" Depending on the particular circumstances of the employment
relationship, an individual of any age can suffer from age discrimi-
11. Race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
12. Title VII only requires a minimum of 15 members for coverage to vest. The ADEA's
higher minimum is probably a result of Congress' desire to gradually phase coverage down
to a level comparable with Title VII, as was done with Title VII itself.
13. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(b), 630(c) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1970). Employ-
ment agencies, regardless of their size, are covered by the Act. Brennan v. Paragon Employ-
ment Agency, 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14. Act of Dec. 15, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 12, 81 Stat. 607, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970).
15. Indeed, there was extensive philosophical debate in the Congress concerning the Act's
lower-end coverage even before its passage. The original Senate bill, S. 830, 90th Cong., let
Sess. (1967), proposed coverage only for individuals at least 45 years of age but less than 65
years of age. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare agreed to reduce the lower-
end age limit to 40 "since testimony indicated this to be the age at which discrimination in
employment usually becomes evident." S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967). A
substantial number of congressmen proposed further reductions in the lower-end limit, and
even no lower-end limit at all. These proposals were aimed primarily at overcoming certain
airline company rules which required stewardesses to retire at anywhere between the ages of
32 and 35. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1967) (supplemental views).
It now seems clear that unless stewards are also required to resign at the same age as are the
stewardesses, these rules would violate Title VII. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
16. On the other hand, an employer must hire an individual at 64, while he can refuse
that same individual employment, or even fire him the following year.
17. See Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19
N.Y.L.F. 309, 321-23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Agatstein].
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nation, discrimination which the Congress should seek to outlaw. 8
It can, however, be maintained, as was successfully argued in Con-
gress, that age discrimination does not "burden commerce" signifi-
cantly unless practiced against individuals over age forty." Appar-
ently, Congress decided that the government's limited resources
should be utilized only in protecting individuals over forty, who are
presumably the persons who have the greatest difficulty finding and
keeping employment.
The Act's upper age limit, sixty-five, has been justified as bearing
a reasonable relationship to the age when individuals, at least as a
general rule, cease to effectively function as part of the work force.2 0
To the extent that older individuals may suffer any dislocation, the
problem is at least partially offset by the availability of Social Secu-
rity benefits. Despite the merits of these views, the counter argu-
ments are very convincing. Retirement at age sixty-five, first pro-
posed by Otto Von Bismark when the average life expectancy was
only thirty-five years, no longer reasonably reflects the age when an
individual becomes a liability as an employee.' It is seemingly in-
consistent that the government should argue for an individual to be
judged on merit, and not on generalized assumptions until the age
of sixty-five, 2 while simultaneously accepting the principle that all
individuals over sixty-five are presumed incapable of remaining on
the work force, and thus denied the Act's protection.
Nevertheless, after having heard all the legal and philosophical
arguments in favor of change, Congress, when it amended the Act
in 1974, decided to retain the original upper and lower age limits.
Therefore, at least for the moment, the "relatively" old and young
have been left without the benefits of federal law to aid them in
protecting their employment status.
18. The Labor Department's interpretative bulletin on the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1968),
seems to legitimize exactly this type of discrimination in the apprenticeship area. Thus,
under 29 C.F.R. § 860.106 (1969), an employer may limit apprentices to "youths under
specified ages." It can be said, therefore, that an "adult" of 25 who is refused entrance into
such an apprenticeship program has suffered arbitrary age discrimination. See also S. REP.
No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1967) (individual views of Senator Dominick); note 15
supra.
19. See S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967). It also can be argued that age
discrimination is "virtually" non-existent at ages under forty.
20. Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974).
21. Agatstein, supra note 17, at 322.
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(iii) (1968). See notes 74-110 infra and accompanying
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B. Procedural Requirements
1. Suits by Aggrieved Parties
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA contains no specific provision for the
filing of a charge with a federal agency. 3 The Act prescribes certain
notice requirements which must be fulfilled before an allegedly ag-
grieved party may maintain any action, legal or equitable. Thus, no
individual may commence a civil action unless he has given the
Secretary of Labor sixty days notice of his intent to file such ac-
tion.24 This notification must be filed within one hundred eighty
days of the alleged unlawful practice.2 1 If, however, the practice has
occurred in a state which has both a law prohibiting age discrimina-
tion in employment and a state agency authorized to seek relief for
individuals suffering age discrimination, the notice must be filed
within three hundred days of the alleged unlawful practice or within
thirty days of the aggrieved individual's receipt of notice of termina-
tion of state proceedings, whichever is earlier.26 Upon receipt of such
notice the Secretary must promptly notify all prospective defen-
dants and seek to resolve the problem through conciliation.27
The sixty day notice requirement has been held to be jurisdic-
tional.2 8 The courts have reasoned that since the conciliation re-
quirement was essential," the Labor Department was to be allowed
a specific period of time, sixty days, to attempt an informal resolu-
tion of age discrimination claims prior to any litigation.3
23. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), which provides for the filing of a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as the EEOC] by or on behalf
of a person claiming to be aggrieved. The ADEA's lack of such a statutory provision, however,
does not prevent aggrieved parties from informally filing charges with the Labor Department,
the agency which administers the ADEA. See Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Kan. 1973); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. No court has yet decided whether the Secretary's failure to conciliate will bar a
private suit. Cf. Brennan v. Ace Hardware, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); note 59 infra and
accompanying text.
28. Price v. Maryland Gas Co., 62 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Miss. 1972); Burgett v. Cudahy Co.,
361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1971). The notice itself need meet no formal requirements, as long
as it contains both the basic facts of the charge and the names of individuals involved. Id. at
621. "Notification and Intent to Sue," Wage-Hour Administrative Opinion, 8 LAB. REL. REP.
§ 401, at 5213 (1968).
29. Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 619-21 (D. Kan. 1971). The ADEA concilia-
tion provision is identical to § 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
30. Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 621-23 (D. Kan. 1971). This notice require-
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The one hundred eighty day time period for the filing of notice
with the Labor Department has also been held to be a precondition
to civil suit.3 ' The court, in Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,32 in holding that this provision was jurisdictional, rejected the
purported discriminatees' claim that the notice provision was analo-
gous to the one hundred eighty day "charging" requirements found
in Title VII.1 3 The court noted:
The 180 day notice requirement of the ADEA is contained in
the subsection expressly dealing with time limits on civil ac-
tions. On the other hand, the [180] day charging requirement
of [Title VII] is found in an entirely separate subsection which
precedes the subsection limiting the filing of civil actions under[Title VII] .. .. 34
One court has held, however, that a complainant's failure to comply
with such requirements is not fatal if it is found that the delin-
quency is "excused by the actions of the employer." 5
Presently, a purportedly aggrieved party may also have to meet
the requirements of § 633(b) 31 as a jurisdictional precondition to a
ment also allows the Secretary time to investigate so he can decide if he wishes to bring suit
himself. See Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 7 FEP Cases 510 (D.D.C. 1974); text accompanying
note 61 infra.
31. Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Gebhard
v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973); S. RFP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967).
32. 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
33. 290 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1970). While "not insensitive" to the policy considerations ad-
vanced by the claimant, the court was obviously more concerned with Congress' apparent
desire to insure that potential defendants were rapidly informed of both the claims made
against them and the possibility for civil suit. See 113 CONG. REc. 35,056 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Javits).
34. 494 F.2d at 488. The court also noted that the Title VII charging requirement has been
considered jurisdictional, although liberally construed. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), where it was held that an employee's resort to contractual
grievance procedures tolls the 180-day charging period.
35. Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 7 FEP Cases 510, 519 (D.D.C. 1974). The employer's
failure to post informative notices required by § 627 excused the complainants' non-
compliance with § 626(d). The court also relied on the relative "newness" of the Act in
waiving its jurisdictional prerequisites. See also Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504, 507
(D.D.C. 1973). No appellate court has yet ruled on whether each claimant in a class action
suit must independently satisfy the notice requirements of § 626(d). The district courts,
however, have been split. Compare Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 623-25 (D. Kan.
1971), with Oshiro v. Pan Am. World Airways, 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974). Following
the approach developed under Title VII, it would appear that each individual need not satisfy
the notice requirement, as long as the class representative has done so. See Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
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civil suit. This section specifies that in a state having an age dis-
crimination law and an appropriate agency to enforce it
no suit may be brought under Section 626 of this title before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been comm-
enced under the state law, unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated.3 7
Analogizing this section to the EEOC's jurisdictional deferral
specified in § 706(b) of Title VII, the Third Circuit has decided that
an aggrieved party must file a complaint with the state agency and
wait the required period of time before he may proceed with his
federal court remedies .3 The court based its decision on Congress'
purported desire to allow the states an opportunity to resolve age
discrimination issues before involving the federal government.3 9
Therefore, this requirement stands in addition to, and not in lieu
of, the notice requirements of § 626.
Judge Garth's concurring opinion sets forth a more persuasive
analysis leading to a quite different conclusion."° He argues that the
prohibitions of § 633(b) take effect only when an aggrieved party has
freely decided to first pursue state remedies. Having committed
himself to a state agency, the aggrieved party is then obligated to
allow these state proceedings a reasonable opportunity, i.e., sixty
days,4' to function.
Judge Garth supports his position with several arguments. First,
he notes that § 626,42 and not § 633, 43 deals with the ADEA's juris-
dictional prerequisites to civil suit. Standing alone, this reasoning
would be unpersuasive in light of analogous treatment of Title VII.
Section 706(e) of Title VII does not concern itself with preconditions
to civil suit. Nevertheless, its one hundred eighty day charging pe-
37. Id.
38. Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1974). Presumably, the Secretary is
also barred from instituting suit unless the aggrieved party complies with § 633(b). Nothing
in the court's opinion, however, indicates that the aggrieved party is prohibited from filing
his intent to sue notice during this state waiting period. Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S.
522 (1972).
39. 492 F.2d at 15-16.
40. Judge Garth's opinion is officially designated a concurrence, because the majority
considered it inequitable to deny relief, in view of the total absence of any judicial decision
construing § 633(b) during the period involved here. Id. at 15.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
42. Id. § 626.
43. Id. § 633.
1974
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riod is considered jurisdictional.44 Title VII, however, has no provi-
sion analogous to § 633(a) of the Act, which discusses the relation-
ship of the federal and state governments in the areas of the Act's
concern. More particularly, § 633(a) specifies that the ADEA shall
in no way preempt any similar state law. Thus, it seems reasonable
to assume that § 633 was directed primarily toward federal-state
relationships, and only secondarily toward complainants' proce-
dural obligations. This analysis leads to a conclusion that the §
633(b) prohibitions become operational only after the federal-state
choice has been made in favor of the state, not that an aggrieved
party must, in all cases, first proceed through a state agency.,5
As a practical matter, Judge Garth's conclusions are sound for
another reason. Under the majority's analysis, it would appear that
the Secretary is also barred from suit unless an aggrieved party first
goes to a state agency for relief. Section 633(b) is not limited to
private suits, but applies to all suits brought under § 626. Thus,
what would be forbidden to an aggreived party would also be forbid-
den to the Secretary. Yet, § 17 of the FLSA,46 and now § 16(c)47 as
well, authorize the Secretary to bring suit without precondition.
Since these sections have been incorporated into the ADEA,45 modi-
fied only by a conciliation requirement,49 it must be presumed that
an aggrieved party's compliance with § 633(b) is not a precondition
to government suit.
Despite the relative merits of the majority and minority positions
in Goger, the law is clear. Section 633(b) is deemed to be jurisdic-
tional, at least in the Third Circuit. °
Finally, in addition to the strictures of both §§ 626(d) and 633(b),
44. Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. But see Agatstein, supra note 17, at 319-23, who apparently accepts the majority
opinion in Goger.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
47. Id. § 216(c). This section was extensively revised in 1974, eliminating, inter alia, a
phrase which prohibited the Secretary from bringing suit over an unsettled issue of law. 29
U.S.C.A. § 216(c) (Supp. June 1974).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
49. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra.
50. The § 633(b) prohibitions, if they continue to be construed as jurisdictional, become
dangerous to an aggrieved party only in light of the applicable state law. Having missed the
applicable state charging or notice period, an aggrieved party, in effect, can never comply
with § 633(b). Having failed to meet its requirements, he is barred from suit, even if he has
complied with § 626. Once in this position, an aggrieved party will have to rely on the
Secretary to bring suit on his behalf, if, in fact, the Secretary can do so. See text accompany-
ing notes 55-60 infra.
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§ 626(e)5 ' specifies that § § 6 and 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act" shall
apply to all actions brought under the ADEA, whether by an ag-
grieved party or the Secretary. The Portal-to-Portal Act in turn
places a two-year statute of limitations on civil actions, except that
the period of limitation is increased to three years for willful viola-
tions.53
2. Suits by the Secretary of Labor
While authorizing private suits, the ADEA also incorporates the
major enforcement provisions of the FLSA.5' Thus, the Secretary
may seek back pay for a discriminatory employment practice as
though it were "unpaid minimum wages"55 or "unpaid overtime
compensation." 6 He may also seek appropriate individual or class-
wide injunctive relief.57 The Secretary's decision to bring suit, how-
ever, terminates a private party's right to sue.58
By taking part of its enforcement structure from Title VII, §
626(b) of the ADEA copies that Act's conciliation requirements.
The Secretary must, therefore, seek to achieve voluntary compli-
ance through conciliation, conference and persuasion before bring-
ing suit against any defendant. Failure to follow these requirements,
in substance as well as in form, can result in the dismissal of any
subsequent suit. 9
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1970).
52. Id. §§ 251-62.
53. Parties bringing suit under the ADEA are entitled to a jury trial as to damages.
Liquidated damages and attorney's fees are matters for the sound discretion of the court.
Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
55. Cf. id. § 216(b).
56. Id.
57. Cf. Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); 29 U.S.C.
§ 217 (1970).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1970). Because individual suits are governed by the strictures of
§ 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970), employees may bring suits for other "similarly
situated" employees only upon such other employees' written consent, such consent to be
filed in court. When compared with the much more liberal treatment given class action suits
under Title VII, it can be seen that a private right to sue is not nearly the valuable plaintiff's
litigation tool under the ADEA that it has been under Title VII. See Burgett v. Cudahy, 361
F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1971).
59. See, e.g., Brennan v. Ace Hardware Co., 495 F.2d 368, 376 (8th Cir. 1974). Three
meetings between a compliance officer and company officials were deemed insufficient at-
tempts at conciliation, where the compliance officer never requested back wages for the
employee suffering the alleged discrimination.
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II. THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF
The plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Having made such a prima facie showing, the bur-
den then shifts to the defendant to justify the existence of any
disparities. Alternatively, he may show that the conduct was not
motivated by age bias or that it was justified by a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification ("BFOQ").10
In determining what will constitute a prima facie showing of dis-
crimination, the court, in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates,"' stated that
the plaintiff was required to show "more than simply the fact that
he was within the protected age group and that he was adversely
affected by an employment decision." The "more" requirement
imposed by the Jelleff court is undoubtedly influenced by the Su-
preme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.2
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Powell enunciated the four
criteria necessary to create a prima facie case under Title VII: (1)
the complainant must be within the protected group; (2) he must
have applied for and been qualified for a job for which the defendant
was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he must have
been rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the defendant must have
continued to seek applicants for the position.13
While there has not yet been a Supreme Court case dealing with
the ADEA, it is reasonably safe to assume that a plaintiff need not
show a defendant's intent to discriminate in order to create a prima
facie case.14 As in cases brought pursuant to Title VII, it will proba-
bly be sufficient for a plaintiff to show the defendant's policy or
practice has a "differential impact" on those in the protected class.
It also seems clear that a plaintiff can sustain his burden of showing
a prima facie case and a "differential impact" through the use of
statistics. In Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association," the Secretary introduced evidence to show that in a
specific time period (one year after the effective date of the ADEA),
60. See Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 7 FEP Cases 817 (7th Cir. 1974).
61. 7 FEP Cases 510, 520 (D.D.C. 1974).
62. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Although McDonnell Douglas is a case brought under Title VII,
the similarity between the substantive provisions of Title VII and the ADEA would lead to
the conclusion that the same standards of proof will apply in cases of age discrimination. See
also Wilson v. Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. 411 U.S. at 802.
64. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
65. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the defendant had not hired one person within the protected age
group. In Schulz v. Hickok Manufacturing Co.," the Secretary in-
troduced evidence to show that the average age of the alleged discri-
minatee's peers had been reduced from 53.39 years to 40.75 years
during an eighteen month period surrounding the time of his alleg-
edly illegal discharge. This "steep decrease" in employee ages was
an instrumental factor in the court's decision, which found the dis-
charge violative of the Act." Conversely, it seems that a defendant
may be able to successfully defend against an age discrimination
charge, absent "specific acts of discrimination," by showing that it
has hired numerous employees within the protected age class.68
Obviously, a plaintiff can also make out a prima facie case by
showing specific incidents of discriminatory conduct. For example,
a prima facie case has been established where an employer's person-
nel officer made notes during an employment interview indicating
the applicant is too old for a position, or where a job description
required individuals under forty years of age."
III. THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN OF PROOF
Given the plaintiff's creation of a prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation, three defenses are available to a defendant. It is not unlaw-
ful for an employer, employment agency or labor organization
to take any action otherwise prohibited . . .where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differential is based on reasonable factors other than age.70
Similarly a defendant can defend his actions based upon the observ-
ance of "the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension or insurance
66. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
67. Id. at 1213. See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
68. It should be pointed out that, according to the Labor Department's ADEA interpreta-
tive bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 860.91(b) (1968), it would also be unlawful for a defendant to show
preference for the younger or older of two men within the protected class, i.e., a job preference
to a 42-year old man rather than a 52-year old man, or vice versa.
69. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Marquez
v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358
F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
70. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
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plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter
. . '71 This exemption, however, does not permit an employer to
refuse to hire any individual." Any of these defenses, successfully
proven, will be sufficient to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie showing
and secure a dismissal of the case.
A. The BFOQ
Unlike race, which can rarely qualify as a BFOQ, an applicant's
age, depending upon the circumstances surrounding each particular
situation, may qualify as a BFOQ. The Labor Department, how-
ever, has sought to restrict utilization of this defense. The Depart-
ment's interpretative bulletin states that the BFOQ defense
must be construed narrowly, and the burden of proof in estab-
lishing that it applies is the responsibility of the employer...
which relies upon it.7"
Prior to the preparation of this article, there has been only one
reported appellate case dealing with the BFOQ defense to a claim
of age discrimination.74 In that case, the defendant, Greyhound,
refused to hire any individual over the age of 35 for the position of
inter-city bus driver, claiming this policy was necessary both to the
safe and efficient operation of its business and to the public wel-
fare.75 The district court found Greyhound's policy violated the
ADEA.76 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the essence of
Greyhound's business, safe public transportation, would be under-
mined absent its ability to utilize its maximum-age hiring policy."
The Seventh Circuit's decision indicates that courts may be more
responsive to age BFOQ defenses than they have been to BFOQ
defenses in Title VII litigation. While the court engaged in a com-
plex analysis detailing the standards which a defendant must meet
in sustaining its burden of proof when alleging a BFOQ defense, the
court's actual findings are quite simple:78 degenerative physical
71. Id § 623(f)(2).
72. Id.
73. 29 C.FR. § 860.102(b) (1968).
74. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 7 FEP Cases 817 (7th Cir. 1974).
75. These inter-city runs require a driver to be on call 24 hours daily and to work an
excessive number of consecutive hours. Since the runs are generally considered to be undesir-
able, the drivers who staff them are inevitably low on the company seniority list.
76. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
77. 7 FEP Cases at 822.
78. Id. at 820.
Vol. 13: 227
Age Discrimination
changes caused by aging have a detrimental impact on skills requir-
ing, inter alia, fast reflex reaction. Since inter-city bus drivers must
possess such skills without impairment, Greyhound's policy of ex-
cluding applicants over thirty-five years of age was legitimate. Of
particular note was the court's apparent acquiescence in the general
proposition that all people undergo the same type of degenerative
physical changes as they age, and that each "over 35" applicant
therefore need not be given an individualized test to discover
whether or not he qualifies for employment. 9 This decision thus
rejected the Labor Department's position that
a claim for a differentiation will not be permitted on the basis
of an employer's assumption that every employee over a certain
age . . . becomes physically unable to perform the duties of
[the] job . . . [Each case must] be determined on an indi-
vidual case by case basis, not on the basis of any general or
class concept . . . 0
As the court noted, generalized objective hypotheses concerning an
average driver's ability to efficiently perform his work should be
sufficient justification for a BFOQ, because it is virtually impossible
to predict how each individual driver will perform.8
While the Greyhound case represents somewhat of a break-
through for the BFOQ defense, its significance should not be exag-
gerated. The essence of the decision still revolves around this spe-
cific employer's absolute need for employees with the ability to
rapidly react to unexpected driving situations during an extended
workday. Most employees will simply not be faced with such de-
manding working conditions, nor will there be such an intimate
relationship to the public welfare. For example, the average
assembly-line worker probably does not need the same reflexive
reactions required in Greyhound in order to effectively perform his
work. The presumptively slower reflex reactions in the older individ-
ual should not, in that case justify a BFOQ. Further, the length and
pressures of the workday may be such that older employees can, in
any event, adequately perform the job. If the inter-city bus drivers
79. See also Hodgson v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 4 FEP Cases 728 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
80. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103(d), (f)(1)(iii) (1968).
81. 7 FEP Cases at 820-21. See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898
(2d Cir. 1960). "[P]resent medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to predict with
accuracy those [specific] individuals most likely to suffer [heart] attacks."
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in Greyhound were only required to work an eight, instead of a
twelve hour day, the "reflex impairment factor" may have been
non-existent or so negligible as to invalidate a BFOQ defense. Fi-
nally, even in situations where individuals in the covered class can-
not meet the job criteria, the employer may still have to show that
the criteria themselves are reasonable, e.g., that inter-city bus driv-
ers actually need all the skills Greyhound claims they need."2 Thus,
the fact that individuals in the protected class may not meet certain
job criteria could conceivably force a recision of such criteria.,3
B. Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
Additionally, a defendant may show that its personnel action was
based "on reasonable factors other than age." Like the judicial pre-
cedent created under the National Labor Relations Act,84 a decision
motivated partially by age factors and partially by factors other
than age remains unlawful. 5 If, however, an employer's decision is
motivated by an employee's faulty work record, a reduction in force
whereby only the most efficient employees are retained, or even a
personal dislike for the employee in question, the decision will be
upheld as a valid exercise of managerial discretion. 6 As the Labor
Department's interpretative bulletin clearly states,
It was not the purpose or intent of Congress in enacting this Act
to require the employment of anyone, regardless of age, who is
disqualified on grounds other than age from performing a par-
ticular job."7
As in Title VII, however, potential problem areas must immedi-
ately be recognized. Just as certain allegedly "reasonable" criteria,
on which employment and especially hiring decisions are based,
82. Consider the courts' refusals to accept customer preference as a basis for a BFOQ
under Title VII. Cf. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
83. Several of the Wage-Hour Administrator's opinion letters confirm this analysis. In
specific cases dealing with newspaper work, Wage-Hour Administrative Opinion, 8 LAB. REL.
REP. § 401, at 5213 (1969); outdoor labor, id. at 5211 (1969); and oil field work, id. at 5205
(1968), the government has insisted on a case-by-case decision regarding covered employees'
ability to perform the work in question. Absent the peculiar circumstances of the Greyhound
case, these rulings, which are entitled to great judicial deference, may be controlling. See
Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225, 228-29 (D. Minn. 1971).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970).
85. Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 7 FEP Cases 510 (D.D.C. 1974).
86. See, e.g., Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Brennan
v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1968).
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have been found to hinder black employment, thereby violating
Title VII, these same criteria may violate the ADEA. For example,
the Labor Department has already indicated that written tests will
be considered highly suspect under the ADEA. 81 This position stems
from its belief that "protected" applicants, who are presumably
further removed from an educational environment than their
younger counterparts, are not test wise, and will therefore score
poorly on such tests.89 Similarly, the Labor Department has argued
that employment application questions which ask an applicant's
age, although not per se illegal, are highly suspect. 0 Therefore, in
order to at least partly offset their own suspicions, the Labor De-
partment has advised employers to include the following sentence
in their employment application:
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age with respect to individuals
who are at least 40 but less than 65 years of age.9
Finally, the Labor Department considers the higher cost of em-
ploying or training a protected employee to be insufficient justifica-
tion for adverse personnel decisions affecting a protected employee.
The government reaches this conclusion even though the economics
involved surely present an employer with reasonable factors other
than age on which to base its decision. The ADEA interpretative
bulletin takes the view that a comparison of employment costs
based on age in itself evidences a determinative, and therefore in-
valid, reliance on age. 2 Labor Department opinions are not in and
of themselves binding. As noted above, these opinions have been
rejected by the courts in both the Greyhound and Paragon Employ-
ment Agency cases. In view of the judiciary's general policy of defer-
ring to agency guidelines, however, employers, employment agen-
cies and labor organizations act at great peril when they ignore the
88. Id. § 860.104(b) (1969).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 860.95 (1968).
91. Id. In line with this reasoning, the Labor Department has taken the substantive
position that any help wanted notices or advertisements which contain words such as
"young," "boy" or "college student" are prohibited by the ADEA. Id. § 860.92. This blanket
prohibition seems both extreme and inflexible. Indeed, it already has been struck down in
one court test. Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency, 356 F. Supp. 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1968). See also "Age as a Factor in Training," Wage-Hour
Administrative Opinion, 8 LAn. REL. REP. § 401, at 5227 (1969).
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strict manner in which the Labor Department interprets, and is
attempting to enforce the ADEA.
C. Bona Fide Seniority Systems and Benefit Plans
Section 623(f)(2) of the Act provides that:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency
or labor organization . . . (2) to observe the terms of a bona
fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act,
except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual.
This provision is unique to the ADEA, and, in fact, was not even
included in the original Senate bill. But as Senator Javits, the spon-
sor of the amendment including the provision, has noted:
The lack of any such provisions was a serious defect. . . since
in its absence an employer might actually have been discour-
aged from hiring older workers because of the increased costs
involved in providing certain types of benefits to them. 3
To date, both judicial and administrative rulings on § 623(f)(2)
have been middle-of-the-road, in line with both the exemption and
the proviso which appears in the section's last phrase. Thus, while
an employer is allowed to mandatorily retire an employee under the
age of sixty-five pursuant to a company retirement plan, he is for-
bidden from mandatorily retiring the same employee if he is not a
participant in such plan. Similarly, an employer need not provide
covered workers with insurance benefits as liberal as those benefits
provided to younger workers. The employer must, however, expend
an equal amount of money for all workers. 5
The most significant aspect of the exemption, the legal meaning
of the words "bona fide," remains to be defined by the government
and tested in the courts. Under current interpretations, an em-
93. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967).
94. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 7 FEP Cases 222 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd, 8 FEP
Cases 565 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225,
228 (D. Minn. 1971). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1969).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1969). For reasons which remain unarticulated, pension plans
have been excused from this equal cost approach, "Pension Plan: Exclusion of New Hires,"
Wage-Hour Administrative Opinion, 8 LAB. RIL. REP. § 401, at 5227 (1970). In view of the
interpretative bulletin, this Opinion undoubtedly will be rescinded.
96. The Labor Department's interpretative bulletin, at least with respect to retirement,
pension and insurance plans, is currently quite vague.
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ployer may be able to mandatorily retire employees at age fifty, or
even age forty, if such retirement is pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment plan in which the employee participates. Similarly, employers
may be able to deny newly-hired employees covered by the Act, the
right to participate in such plans." If a plan, however, is viewed as
a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act," and not as "bona
fide," such practices would be forbidden. 9s Currently, no govern-
mental guidelines on mandatory retirement ages have been issued.
This task, which undoubtedly means coming to grips with complex
actuarial and statistical data of the type presented in Greyhound,
looms as an area where increasing litigation will be inevitable."
The validity of an employer's mandatory retirement age policy is
but one issue which must be considered in determining whether a
benefit plan is bona fide under the Act. As the Fifth Circuit's recent
decision in Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co. 00 indicates, the type
of plan involved is also an important factor in determining legal-
ity. 0'
The facts in Taft were relatively simple. An employee, who was a
participant in the company's "Profit Sharing Retirement Plan,"
was forced to retire at age sixty, the plan's normal retirement age.
Notwithstanding a clause in the plan which allowed the company,
in its discretion, to postpone the employee's departure, the company
refused the employee's request for later retirement. Subsequently,
the company also refused to treat the employee as a "new" job
applicant, thus denying his request for rehire. The Profit Sharing
Retirement Plan was itself funded solely through company profits.'0
97. Under the equal cost approach, an employer would be obligated to expend an equal
amount on the covered employee. Intangible benefits, however, may still motivate an em-
ployer to restrict participation of covered employees. See also Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 202, 88 Stat. 829, which specifically permits
exclusion of a new hire from a plan if his age is within five years of the plan's normal
retirement age.
98. The Labor Department could argue, for example, that forced retirement at age 50,
even in the context of a retirement plan, is per se a subterfuge. Cf. Murgia v. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement, 8 FEP Cases 18 (D. Mass. 1974).
99. As in so many other areas of the law, no simple guidelines will solve the current
ambiguities. Thus, a bona fide retirement age could vary from industry to industry. Similarly,
it may vary by sex, or even location. Therefore, legal guidelines probably will be developed
quite slowly and, at least initially, on a case by case basis.
100. 8 FEP Cases 565 (5th Cir. 1974).
101. As a secondary concern, the Taft opinion dealt with the factors which might deter-
mine legality of mandatory under-65 retirement. See note 104 infra.
102. The yearly contribution was set at ten percent of company profits.
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At the end of the year, each employee received a certain number of
benefit "units" based on his salary, length of service and age. The
plan also specified that once an employee reached sixty years of age,
he could no longer accumulate additional units, even though he
might be allowed to continue working.
On these facts, the court, with a dissent, ruled the company's plan
to be a bona fide benefit plan for ADEA purposes. It, therefore,
sanctioned the company's decision to mandatorily retire the em-
ployee involved. Quite clearly, the Taft decision represents the first
appellate attempt to interpret § 623(f)(2).
Initially, the court rejected the Labor Department's contention
that the combination profit sharing-retirement plan was basically
a profit sharing plan, and thus not within the § 623(f)(2) exemp-
tion.10 3 In seeking to promote this interpretation, the government
emphasized that the sole purpose of § 623(f)(2) was to immunize
American business from maintaining and funding costly benefit
programs for newly hired, older workers. The type of profit sharing
plan maintained by Taft, however, did not present the company
with those financial difficulties. The government argued that this
conclusion followed, because the expenses of funding the Taft plan
bore no relation to any employee's age, or to any actuarial computa-
tions. Instead, funding expenses were based upon a fixed percentage
of company profits. Therefore, the purpose of the exemption would
not be served by including this plan. Indeed, the general purposes
of the Act would be undermined by allowing the company to force
the retirement of a covered individual.
In rejecting the government's arguments, the court concluded
that the operative words of the exemption, "employee benefit plan"
were quite broad, and surely included a profit sharing retirement
plan.' 4 Moreover, the court emphasized the practical difficulties in
judging each case on the basis of Congress' purported desires, i.e.,
the avoidance of virtually insurmountable heavy cost burdens. Such
103. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 7 FEP Cases 222, 223 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
104. Judge Tuttle, dissenting, also appeared to adopt this position. He disagreed with the
majority because he believed that the company's right, in its sole discretion, to allow post-
sixty employment took the plan out of the bona fide catagory. To be bona fide, a plan "must
state in categorical terms that its members are subject to compulsory retirement at a time
or under conditions differing from those of the statute (age 65)." 8 FEP Cases at 571. This
rationale was specifically rejected in Steiner v. National League, 8 FEP Cases 941 (C.D. Cal.
1974). The Steiner rationale seems more appropriate, since it allows the employer to delay
retirement age of those who are capable of continuing employment, thereby effectuating the
broad aims of the Act.
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actions should thus be shunned, especially when the Act's words are
so clear.
The court's conclusion is unwarranted. The Act's legislative his-
tory seems to leave little doubt that Congress' intention was pre-
cisely and solely as the Labor Department had represented. Grant-
ing use of the exemption to benefit plans whose costs bore no rela-
tion to employee ages created a statutory loophole which Congress
had not intended. Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether
the wording of the exemption is as clear and as broad as character-
ized by the court. While it may be true that the words "retirement,
pension or insurance plan[s]" served to describe types of "em-
ployee benefit plan[s]," and were not words of limitation, it is
equally true that each of these plans is generally presumed to be
based on actuarial formulae. One can make an entirely reasonable
argument, therefore, that these words have been employed to de-
scribe the type of plan eligible for the exemption, 15 and that Taft's
plan did not qualify.
Braunstein v. Commissioner,"°6 upon which the court relied heav-
ily, is readily distinguishable. In that case a disgruntled taxpayer
sought to avoid the clear meaning of a section of the tax code by
arguing that Congress had not intended the provision to apply to his
situation. The Supreme Court rejected his claim, using the argu-
ment which was later adopted in Taft. The only similarity between
the two cases, however, is their result. Braunstein sought to create
a legal loophole; the government in Taft sought to close one. Given
the presumptively narrow construction of statutory exemptions, it
is surprising that the Taft court treated Braunstein with such defer-
ence. More significantly, the factual situations in the two cases were
entirely different. The Braunstein Court specifically noted that
nothing in the legislative history of the tax code indicated a Con-
gressional intent to exempt the taxpayer. °7 The ADEA's legislative
history, however, clearly indicates Congress' concern over an in-
crease in business costs if employers were obligated both to employ
older workers and to maintain benefit plans for them. It was this
concern, and this concern alone, which prompted inclusion of §
105. Under this analysis, a plan which was not a retirement, pension or insurance plan
could still qualify, as long as there was some nexus between funding costs and employee ages.
106. 374 U.S. 65 (1963).




623(f)(2) in the Act.'0 8 The legislative guidance that was lacking in
Braunstein was not lacking in Taft, and, as previously emphasized,
this guidance mitigated in favor of the government.
Finally, the court's decision makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to harmonize § 623(f)(2) with its proviso. The proviso obligates em-
ployers, as a class, to hire covered employees who may have been
mandatorily retired by their previous employer. The exemption,
however, allows the former employer to retire the employee in the
first place. At first glimpse, the arrangement makes little sense. The
possibility of rehire with a new employer is far less desirable than
the right to stay on a specific job one might have held for numerous
years. Congress, however, has allowed this more desirable employ-
ment to be denied employees as they age. The reasons for this legis-
lative decision are plain; Congress presumed the new employer
could employ the same individual at a more reasonable cost than
the former employer, even if the employee were paid the same sal-
ary.' °9 Thus, when read together with its proviso, § 623(f)(2) speaks
entirely toward balancing the cost problems inherent in keeping
older employees on the payroll against such covered employees'
rights to continued productivity and employment. The court's opin-
ion, however, eliminates the basis for Congress' decision. If a spe-
cific employer experiences no cost benefit in forcing his employees
into pre-sixty-five retirement, as was true in Taft, there is simply
no statutory reason to allow him to retire these employees, espe-
cially when every other American employer is thereafter required to
consider hiring them. Considerations of business efficiency alone
dictate against such a result.
In sum, the Taft opinion seems at odds with both Congress' inten-
tions and the actual wording of § 623(f)(2). One would expect, there-
fore, that the government will continue to urge acceptance of its
position.
IV. REMEDIAL RELIEF
Having proved a violation of the ADEA, a plaintiff is entitled to
108. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
109. Notwithstanding even a new employer's obligation to expend equal benefit plan
moneys on all employees, the above conclusion follows. The former employer might have
actually been obligated to spend more money on older employees than younger employees, if
those older employees had acquired certain vested rights during their job tenure.
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such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation
judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion, or enforcing [monetary] liability ... 110
Liquidated damages, up to an amount equal to actual damages, are
also recoverable."' The award of liquidated damages, however, is
restricted to cases of willful violations. " In the case of a private suit,
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees are also recoverable." 3
As a general matter, ADEA litigation has not yet entered the
"recovery stage." Therefore, "[flew courts have actually con-
fronted this complex phase in its practical implementation."", In
view of the Act's purposes and prohibitions, however, which parallel
both the aims and language of Title VII, one must assume that
remedial relief will be dispensed in accord with that statute." 5 Thus,
back pay probably will be awarded to a discriminatee even if a
defendant's actions were based on his own "good faith" belief of
their legality."' Similarly, the the speculative nature of both the
amount of back pay owing, and the persons to whom it is owed,
should not prevent courts from awarding it."' ,
The ADEA has also inherited much of its enforcement machinery
from the FLSA. Until 1974, the FLSA prohibited a § 16(c) suit,
"involving an issue of law which has not been finally settled by the
courts . . . "Is This provision has now been deleted from § 16(c)
110. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
111. Id.
112. Id. A willful violation will be found only where there is "a bad faith evasion of the
Act and a definite knowledge of its applicability." Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 7 FEP Cases
510, 520 (D.D.C. 1974).
113. Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Foster v. Irwin,
258 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1966); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
114. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. As mentioned, at note 58 supra, private parties will have some difficulty maintaining
class actions. As a practical matter, therefore, large ADEA monetary judgments may result
very infrequently. Moreover, administrative delay will not financially prejudice defendants
in a way they have suffered under Title VII, for the ADEA two-year statute of limitations
dates from the bringing of a civil action, not from the date a plaintiff first contacts the Labor
Department. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
116. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Schaeffer v. San Diego
Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). A court's opportunity to assess liquidated dam-
ages for willful violations also implies that "non-willful" violations will not be excused.
117. United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'g 328 F.
Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970) (as incorporated into 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
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and, thus, from the ADEA as well." 9 Therefore, whatever Congress'
past intentions concerning remedial relief for "unsettled issues of
law," it now seems clear that such relief, including back pay, can
be awarded. Implicit in the government's newly created right to
bring § 16(c) "unsettled issue" suits is its right to recover back pay
if such suits are successful. This right also should accrue in "unset-
tled issue" suits brought by private parties, and would be in accord
with court practice under Title VII.12e Therefore, even in the initial
cases concerning the validity of employer or labor organization ben-
efit plans,"' potential defendants may well face back pay liability
if they are unsuccessful on the merits.'
A defendant can avoid back pay liability in one other way. A good
faith reliance on, and actions in conformity with, any written Labor
Department opinion, ruling, or regulation will preclude liability
from being imposed on such defendant, even if the applicable rul-
ing, regulation or opinion is struck down by a court or rescinded by
the Labor Department.'2 3 The exemption, however, has been nar-
rowly construed, and the defendant bears the burden of proof.
In sum, a defendant who loses a case on the merits should realisti-
cally expect to face a damaging back pay award, and the prospect
of injunctive relief. As the Fifth Circuit has now stated:
[A]ny doubts about entitlement to back pay should be re-
solved against the [defendant. For] it is [he] who created the
discriminatory situation . . . in the first instance ....
119. See Conf. Rep. 93-358, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1974).
120. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1377 (5th Cir.
1974).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
122. This analysis itself must wait testing in the courts. Section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1970), which is also incorporated into the ADEA by virtue of § 626(e),
specifies, inter alia, that liability shall not accrue if an unsuccessful defendant has relied in
good faith on the Labor Department's prior "administrative practice or enforcement policy."
Thus, it certainly might be argued that an "unsettled issue" suit, even by a private party,
represents a radical change in government "enforcement" policy such that liability is pro-
scribed by § 10. A more reasoned interpretation of § 10, however, is that it applies only to
actual government policies or positions, not to newly emerging areas of concern, for it was
precisely these "new" areas which were the concern of the former § 16(c) of the FLSA.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1970), incorporating the Portal-to-Portal Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. §
259 (1970). A defendant's good faith reliance herein should not be confused with his own,
independently-formed good faith belief that he is acting in a legal manner.




Although the ADEA has been law for over six years, both schol-
arly and judicial interpretation of its provisions has been slow to
develop. Existing analysis has focused primarily on Title VII, from
which the ADEA draws the bulk of its statutory heritage. With the
exception of the Goger decision, which requires an aggrieved party
to pursue state remedies before exercising his federal rights, this
"Title VII analysis" appears to be in harmony both with the Act's
purposes and its statutory language. The Seventh Circuit's
Greyhound decision, for example, acknowledges one of the basic
realities of human existence-that the elderly are, as a rule, more
susceptible to sudden and disabling illness than are the young.
Therefore, BFOQ's under the ADEA must be given the type of
interpretation which would never be justified on the basis of race,
and only rarely by sex. On the other hand, the courts, where possi-
ble, have sought to give the Act the munificent substantive reading
intended by Congress. Thus, in both the Goger and Jelleff cases,
relief has been allowed even though the plaintiffs failed to meet
what the courts involved considered to be the Act's procedural man-
dates.
Unquestionably, the most significant judicial and philosophical
work lies ahead. For while employer and labor organization benefit
plans are fast becoming as integral a part of an employee's working
environment as is his actual take-home salary, the Labor Depart-
ment and the courts have just begun to detail when and if these
plans will be considered bona fide under the ADEA's unique statu-
tory scheme. In view of the difficulty inherent in altering any plan
legally deemed either a "subterfuge," or not bona fide, as well as
the possibility of a large financial liability if a plan is so adjudi-
cated, the Labor Department should immediately set forth its own
determination of which type of plans meet the requirements of the
ADEA and which do not. Only in this way can employers and labor
organizations alike understand what the law requires, and thus for-
mulate plans assured to be in compliance with its terms.
Finally, there is the issue of the Act's coverage. The arguments
advanced for eliminating or revising its jurisdictional scope, pres-
ently forty to sixty-five years of age, do contain merit. These argu-
ments will undoubtedly be aired in the Congress, particularly since
it already has shown its willingness to consider substantial liberali-
zation of Title VII within a decade of its enactment. One must
acknowledge, however, that the jurisdiction arguments now being
1974
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advanced are basically the same ones which Congress rejected in
1967. Since there has not yet been expansive litigation under the
ADEA, it seems highly unlikely that Congress will soon decide to
expand its scope. Unless and until it can be clearly shown that
individuals under forty and over sixty-five are actually suffering
from arbitrary age discrimination, the Act will probably remain
intact.
